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The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) has a statutory obligation to monitor the wholesale 
and retail markets for gas and electricity. The aim of this monitoring is to identify obstacles in the 
operation of the markets and propose measures to improve the way the market operates. This 
report contains the main findings of this monitoring exercise. More specific information on the 
operation of the markets can be found in two underlying reports.
1 
 
This report succinctly summarises the conclusions on the obstacles and the actions that need to be 
taken. It is designed to give market parties, policymakers, politicians, interest groups and energy 
consumers a clear picture of the NMa’s views on the operation of the energy markets. 
 
In compiling this report and the underlying monitoring reports, we received input from various 
external parties, for which we are very grateful. The NMa is of course fully responsible for the 
content of these reports. 
 
The Board of the NMa 
 
 
                                                            
1 The underlying reports are ‘Monitor Groothandelsmarkten gas en elektriciteit’ [Monitor of the wholesale 
markets for gas and electricity] and ‘Monitor kleinverbruikersmarkten gas en elektriciteit’ [Monitor of the 
retail markets for gas and electricity]. These reports have also been published and are available on the NMa 
website, albeit the latter only in Dutch.  
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The operation of the energy markets is improving. The retail market is increasingly becoming a 
market that has much in common with other retail markets, and significant progress has also been 
made in the wholesale markets. Despite this progress, the NMa reports that various improvements 
still need to be made before we are able to describe the energy markets as functioning properly. 
 
The NMa finds that many consumers are still facing obstacles that prevent them from participating 
actively in the energy market. A more active approach would encourage competition between 
energy suppliers, which would in turn benefit consumers in the form of lower prices. The Monitor 
shows that nowadays there are very few reasons why consumers should not play an active role in 
the market. Consumers really do have a choice: there are no fewer than 167 products for electricity 
and 81 for gas. Switching to another supplier is easy these days, and consumers can benefit from 
doing so. By switching suppliers a household can cut its energy bill by anything from a few tens to 
several hundreds of euros a year.  
 
The NMa also observes that despite the progress that has already been made, the wholesale gas 
and electricity markets could and should be more competitive. Because the wholesale markets are 
not yet functioning optimally, the price paid by energy consumers is higher than it would be if the 
markets were functioning effectively. If these markets were more competitive, household energy 
bills would very likely be lower. 
 
Competition in the gas market is mainly impeded by the limited availability of cross-border capacity 
and limited access to flexibility. As a result of the latter, market parties – particularly those 
supplying consumers – are often unable to avoid going to the biggest supplier. Cross-border 
connections are increasingly being used more efficiently in the electricity market, but there is still 




Consumers benefit from more transparency in the retail market. More transparency gives 
consumers a clearer picture of the opportunities to switch and the benefits that switching can 
deliver. The NMa’s annual consumer survey reveals that consumers often underestimate the 
benefits of switching. The overly negative perception consumers have of the potential problems 
they may face when they switch suppliers can also be an obstacle. Many consumers are still under 
the mistaken impression that switching is a hassle, that it will cost them more or that they will even 
end up having their energy supply cut off.  
 
Greater transparency on the actual costs and benefits of switching should change this. 
Transparency will help consumers make better decisions, enabling them to save more money and 
increasing the competitive pressure on energy suppliers. The NMa therefore intends to start  
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actively informing consumers (generically) about the actual costs and risks of switching and how 
they can benefit from participating actively in the energy market. The NMa will also investigate the 
objectivity of price comparison websites in order to increase consumer confidence in this channel. 
 
Finally, the NMa will continue to monitor customer recruitment activities by energy suppliers. 
Aggressive customer recruitment causes a great deal of irritation among consumers and can 




The gas market is still characterised by an extremely high concentration in which one gas supplier 
has by far the most capacity in its hands and supplies most of our gas. Statistical analyses reveal a 
correlation between this concentration and the level of prices on the TTF marketplace. The result of 
this market structure is that competition in the gas market is limited and consumers ultimately pay 
more than they would do in a competitive market. 
 
The most significant obstacle in the gas market is the limited choice open to market parties when 
buying flexibility. Access to flexibility enables market parties to vary the supply of gas over time. The 
limited choice mainly applies to seasonal flexibility, but also to short-term flexibility. Market parties, 
particularly those supplying consumers, can enter into an all-in contract with Gasterra, but besides 
this they have few other options to access flexibility. 
 
The limited availability of seasonal and other flexibility for the market hinders competition in the 
gas market. Sources of seasonal flexibility are available, but market parties other than the present 
contract holder, Gasterra, only have very limited access to them. The NMa considers that the 
present inequitable access to sources of seasonal flexibility instead of broader access for third 
parties is detrimental to the consumer. In the interests of the Netherlands’ development as a gas 
roundabout, the NMa will be raising this obstacle with the Ministry of Economic Affairs (EZ). The 
NMa and other stakeholders will also be re-examining whether more capacity could and should be 
made available via third party access, taking their statutory tasks and existing contracts into 
account. 
 
More sources are available to the market parties for short-term flexibility, but the volume needed to 
be able to supply small consumers is limited in this area too. The TTF marketplace can play an 
important role in this area. The TTF needs to develop as a marketplace in which market parties can 
buy all the products they need to compile their profile. Short-term products are currently offered on 
the TTF, but still to an inadequate extent. If the gas market is to develop, it is important that the 
TTF offer a wide range of tradable products so that market parties can also rely fully on the TTF for 
their flexibility. The proposed amendment of the Gas Act is designed to ensure that more gas 
passes through the TTF and will also pave the way for the development of short-term trading on the 
TTF. But more needs to be done to actually get this trading off the ground. The NMa will explore 
the options for bringing this about and will continue to monitor the development of the TTF. 
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The limited availability of import capacity is another obstacle. The import capacity of the cross-
border connection with Germany is fully booked for the next few years. Despite that, the capacity is 
not being completely utilised – even at times when the price in the Netherlands is higher than that 
in Germany. The unused capacity is rarely sold on. The availability of border capacity has received a 
great deal of attention in the European context. Concrete proposals for European legislation to 
promote secondary trading of capacity are expected in 2010. The Minister of EZ has also 




The wholesale electricity market is much further advanced than the gas market. The monitor 
reveals that there are still some residual obstacles but that various measures have been put in 
place to resolve them. Some measures have been in preparation for a considerable time now, their 
implementation having been repeatedly postponed. This is not a satisfactory situation. The 
challenge is therefore to implement the measures fast.  
 
The electricity market is still a concentrated market. It regularly happens that one or more 
producers are pivotal in meeting the total market demand. The more individual players are pivotal 
and the greater the shortage in the market, the higher the profit for the marginal (price-setting) 
power plant. As a result, electricity generation remains highly profitable, which means that the price 
consumers pay is also higher than it would be with a better market structure. The market will go 
some way to resolve this inefficiency itself: there are various plans afoot for new power plants in the 
Netherlands and for expanding border capacity; this should have the effect of reducing this 
pivotality. But the problem here is that there seems to be insufficient transmission capacity to 
connect all the new power plants to the high-voltage network.  
 
Measures to tackle this obstacle are already being put in place. In November 2009 the high-voltage 
network operator Tennet put forward proposals to make more efficient use of the existing network 
capacity. In addition, EZ introduced a system of congestion management in combination with the 
proposed change to the legislation. This system is designed to ensure that more production 
capacity can be connected while security of supply is monitored. These are temporary measures 
which will ensure that the investments in new power plants can go ahead. Tennet will also need to 
extend the high-voltage network. It is working on this under the supervision of the NMa. 
 
Another obstacle is that the border capacity is still not being optimally utilised. The cross-border 
connections with Germany and Norway in particular are regularly underutilised even though there 
are price differences between the countries. The introduction of market coupling should eliminate 
this inefficiency, as the experience on the border with Belgium shows. The measures to implement 
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The aim of this Monitor is to paint a picture of how far competition on the wholesale and retail 
markets for gas and electricity has progressed and what additional measures need to be taken to 
solve existing obstacles. To do so, we compare the present-day situation in each market with the 
target scenario of a properly functioning market.  
 
A properly functioning market is characterised by efficient pricing. This means that the price of the 
product is determined by the marginal costs and scarcity in the market and not under the influence 
of market power. Some important conditions for efficient pricing are: equal access to infrastructure, 
sufficient freedom of choice for market parties and consumers, and low costs (low thresholds) for 
transactions on the market. The Monitor identifies the obstacles that stand in the way of efficient 
pricing. It also discusses measures for resolving these obstacles.  
 
 
The Energy Markets Monitor is a call to all stakeholders to play a role in resolving the obstacles. 
The NMa itself has a major responsibility to do so based on its statutory tasks. Monitoring is one 
of them, but they also include regulating tariffs, supervision and protecting consumers. The NMa is 
of the opinion that other stakeholders in the sector should also take measures to improve the 
energy market. The Monitor therefore also contains proposals for measures which other parties can 
take to improve the way the market operates. 
 
 
This document first provides a description of the target scenario in each market. This is followed by 
a summary of the improvements that have been achieved in the recent past and a description of 
the obstacles that still exist. As most of the obstacles are not new, the most important current 
measures for each market are also described. Finally we discuss the additional measures which the 
NMa believe still need to be taken as a result of the obstacles. 
This structure is applied to the retail market, the wholesale market for gas and the wholesale 
market for electricity respectively.  
 
The overall conclusions provide an overview of the correlation between the markets and between 
the obstacles, enabling priorities to be set in the strategy for tackling the obstacles.  
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2 
 
The retail market is the market in which suppliers sell gas and electricity to households. This 
market has been liberalised since 1 July 2004: consumers can choose their supplier themselves. 
The fact that the NMa keeps a watchful eye on activities in the retail market is partly the result of 
calls by politicians and other parties to protect consumers from unreasonably high prices. In 
addition, electricity and gas suppliers must comply with the quality requirements laid down in the 
NMa permit requirement. 
 
 
The NMa is committed to creating a retail market for energy in which suppliers are encouraged to 
operate as efficiently as possible. A market such as this has the following characteristics:  
-  New suppliers must be able to enter the market easily 
-  Products that suppliers offer must be clear and easily understandable 
-  Consumers must be able to trust the information on which they base their choices 
-  Consumers must be able to switch supplier easily  
-  Suppliers must process complaints efficiently. 
 
Of course, the NMa was not established simply to ensure that all energy users are also active 
energy consumers who are always on the look-out for the best deal. It is ultimately up to 
consumers to decide how actively they wish to participate in the energy market and how much 
effort they are willing to put in to that. The NMa’s mission for the retail market will have succeeded 
when everything is in place to enable consumers who want to do so to become active consumers. 
However, this does not detract from the fact that in view of the sensitivity of electricity and gas as 
products, a high level of market supervision may remain a necessity. 
 
2.2 
The ideal situation outlined above has not yet been achieved in the retail market, although some 
appreciable improvements have been made. Consumers can now choose from a large number of 
suppliers. There is also a wide range of products, and new ones are constantly being added. 
Consciously choosing a particular product can furthermore benefit consumers in terms of price, 
and there is a lot of information out there for consumers, especially on various price comparison 
websites. Consumers are also apparently becoming increasingly satisfied with the service they get 
from their own supplier.  
 
 
In 2009 consumers have a wide range of products to choose from: there are no fewer than 167 
products on the market for electricity and 81 for gas. This is more than last year, especially as far as 
gas products are concerned (see figure 2.1).   
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The options for consumers relate in particular to two aspects: duration (fixed-term or rolling) and 
price (fixed or variable). Electricity consumers can furthermore choose between ‘grey’ or ‘green’ 
electricity. A number of suppliers also differentiate themselves by offering ‘green’ gas. Another way 
to make a product attractive is by offering substantial discounts on contracts via price comparison 
websites, for example, or by offering a certain quantity of free electricity in combination with a 




But despite the choices available, most consumers are still opting for a rolling contract (see figure 




Shown here is the total 
number of unique products 
from which consumers 
could choose on 1 January of 
the years 2006 to 2009, split 
into fixed-price contracts 
and variable-price contracts 
for gas and electricity.












Shown here is the total 
number of unique products 
from which consumers 
could choose on 1 January of 
the years 2006 to 2009, split 
into fixed-price contracts 
and variable-price contracts 
for gas and electricity.












This figure shows the spread 
of types of consumer 






















This figure shows the spread 
of types of consumer 




















1 year rolling 
 
Office of Energy Regulation  - 10 / 38 -  December 2009 
Suppliers of gas and electricity are increasingly offering products designed to recruit new 
customers. Campaigns offering low prices on price comparison websites are very popular, as are 
offers including a certain quantity of free electricity or gas. Other new products focus on reducing 
price uncertainty for the customer. One supplier offers a product whereby half the price tracks the 
market price and the other half is fixed. This gives the customer more certainty that the price will 
remain stable. There is also a product on the electricity and gas market which is only available at a 
fixed price – similar to many common mobile telephony products. This is a product with complete 
price certainty (although consumers do pay a price for this). These examples of product 
differentiation show that the market is developing positively and that consumers are increasingly 
being offered more choices. The NMa views product differentiation positively. It has drawn up 
guidelines
2 designed to ensure that products are easily understandable to consumers at all times. 
 
Depending on the choice consumers make, it can be in their interest to switch to another supplier. 
The price difference between the most expensive offering of a particular product in the market and 
the cheapest gives an indication of the opportunities for consumers to save money. The difference 
between the most expensive supplier of an annual electricity contract and the cheapest on 1 January 
2009 was 23% (EUR 85), for example. For an annual gas contract the difference was 20% (EUR 
150). Figure 2.3 and Table 2.1 show the differences between the cheapest and most expensive 
suppliers of other product groups. The amounts shown are based on the annual consumption of 
an average household: 1530 m




                                                            
2 The revised guidelines on information provision were published in the Government Gazette on 23 
September 2009 (no. 14172) and come into effect on 1 January 2010.  
Figure 2.3
This figure shows the 
percentage difference on 1 
January 2009 between the 
cheapest and most 
expensive supplier of 
particular contract forms: 
rolling, 1 year and 3 year.
Source: permit holders
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It should be noted that this is by no means the maximum saving consumers can make. It does not 
include promotional tariffs, for example, and potential savings from switching from a rolling 
contract to a fixed-term contract are also not shown. Such circumstances increase the potential for 
savings even further.  
 
 
Fixed-term contracts often include a termination fee, however, which should be borne in mind. It is 
possible to terminate a fixed-term contract early. The termination fee some energy companies 
charge is intended to cover aspects such as administration costs and the cost of purchasing gas or 
electricity in advance. The NMa sets maximums for these fees.  
 
When liberalisation in the retail market was introduced, switching suppliers presented all kinds of 
problems. In recent years the NMa has worked with the sector to solve most of the problems. 
Consumers can now switch supplier without giving rise to administrative problems. 
 
A good majority of consumers is satisfied with the service they receive from their energy supplier. 
No fewer than 79% of consumers are satisfied or very satisfied (see figure 2.4). Also, more and 
more consumers are satisfied with their supplier’s complaint processing procedure. Satisfaction 
with complaint processing has risen from 45% in 2006 to 61% in 2009. Only 9% of consumers 
remain dissatisfied with their supplier’s complaint processing procedure. The NMa regards 
complaint processing as an important subject. Efficient complaint processing is fundamental to the 
proper functioning of the retail market because it increases trust in the energy market.  
 
Consumers are furthermore more satisfied with the service they receive when switching supplier 
and with the timeliness of their energy bill. There is still room for improvement in terms of 
readability of the energy bill, however. Many consumers still find it too complicated and confusing. 
The NMa is currently working with the energy sector on voluntary arrangements in the guideline 
‘Betere Energie Nota’s’ [Better energy bills] which will make consumers’ energy bills clearer and 
easier to check. The intention is to implement the guideline in mid-2010. 
Table 2.1
This table shows the 
difference in euros(per year) 
between the cheapest and 
most expensive supplier of 
particular contract forms: 
rolling, 1 year and 3 year.  € 140 € 85 € 70 Elektricity
€ 180 € 150 € 60 Gas
3 year 1 year Rolling
€ 140 € 85 € 70 Elektricity
€ 180 € 150 € 60 Gas
3 year 1 year Rolling 
 




Although various improvements have been achieved, there are still several obstacles in the retail 
market which are hindering competition. Suppliers are finding it difficult to expand their market 
share, while consumers are still facing obstacles which are preventing them from becoming more 
active and thus exercising competition pressure on suppliers.  
 
One of these residual obstacles is the limited operation of the wholesale market, particularly that of 
gas. Because suppliers in the retail market have few opportunities to purchase their gas and the 
flexibility they need on the wholesale market themselves, their opportunities for diversifying their 
purchasing are also limited. Most suppliers looking to purchase gas with a high degree of seasonal 
flexibility can only do so from Gasterra (see chapter 3). This impedes opportunities for suppliers to 
apply different purchasing strategies, which limits competition in the retail market. This may lead 
to higher gas prices for consumers. 
 
Despite the increase in the number of consumers who actively enter into an energy contract, there 
is a large group of consumers who are still relatively passive. The fact that more and more 
consumers are playing a more active role is evident from the annual increase in the percentage of 
households switching to a different supplier. Whereas about 5% of households switched to a 
different supplier in 2006, this had increased to over 9% by 2008. Since the liberalisation of the 
retail market a total of 28% of households have switched to a different supplier at least once. This 
figure represents the total number of switchers; it should be pointed out that it also includes 
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still have a joint market share of 80% of the electricity market and 76% of the gas market
3. About 
70% of all households are therefore still with their original supplier. However, this group of 70% 
may also include consumers who have switched to another product with the same supplier.  
 
The NMa’s annual consumer survey reveals that the percentage of consumers who are considering 
switching has increased from 23% to 29%. This year 6% of respondents stated that they will 
definitely, or are very likely to, switch supplier. Another 23% stated that they do not have a negative 
attitude towards switching.  
 
One barrier is the fact that consumers do not believe that the benefit of switching will outweigh the 
cost to them in terms of ‘fuss and bother’. But the survey also reveals that many consumers 
underestimate the potential savings to be made. A third barrier which must not be underestimated 
is irritation with active customer recruitment. Although customer recruitment is necessary and 
ensures dynamism in the market, it can also have the opposite effect: people can become irritated 
and develop an aversion to the energy market.  
 
 
Above we have described some of the obstacles inherent in the operation of the retail market: the 
limited competition in the wholesale market for gas, and the perception of many consumers that 
the risks and costs of participating actively in the energy market do not outweigh the benefits. 
 
The problem of limited competition in the gas market is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. Over 
the past few years the NMa has taken various measures in respect of consumer confidence in the 
energy market. These measures primarily entailed getting the ‘basics’ of the retail market in order; 
in other words, measures aimed at simplifying switching procedures, making administration more 
efficient and putting effective complaint processing procedures in place. Other measures that have 
been introduced include legally regulated supervision of the suppliers themselves (through 
permits) and the prices they charge (through the so-called ‘safety net’ arrangement) under which 
consumer prices must always be related to the costs the suppliers incur themselves. These 
measures have already brought about improvements, as we have seen above in the form of 
increased satisfaction with and trust in suppliers. 
 
Active customer recruitment is an increasing source of irritation to consumers. Although customer 
recruitment is part of the necessary dynamism of the liberalised market, causing irritation among 
consumers could lead to consumers developing an aversion to the energy market. The NMa 
already monitors the customer recruitment activities of energy suppliers. As part of this, the 
suppliers’ customer recruitment activities are to be held up to the light to ensure they adhere to the 
guidelines on information provision and the code of conduct. In addition, cooperation with the 
                                                            
3 The difference in the market share of the three largest energy suppliers (the C3) between electricity and gas 
is due to the fact that there are more 'traditional' suppliers in the gas market than in the electricity market. 
The C3 for gas has therefore always been lower than for electricity.  
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Dutch Consumer Authority and OPTA, the Dutch Independent Post and Telecommunications 




The third European package of energy measures contains additional provisions relating to 
consumer protection, covering areas such as complaint processing, dispute settlement and 
increasing transparency. For example, new provisions are being included in the European directives 
which are intended to ensure consumers are informed frequently and adequately about their energy 
consumption and what it costs. Other changes stipulate that consumers must be able to switch to 
another supplier within a period of three weeks. These new legal measures can play a role in 
improving consumer confidence in the energy market and help to persuade consumers that the 
cost of switching is not as high as they think. 
 
In 2010 the bill for improving the market model will go back to the Dutch parliament for 
discussion. This bill paves the way for the introduction of a standard supplier model. The 
introduction of the supplier model makes the supplier the only point of contact for its customers in 
matters concerning the supply of gas and electricity and the associated administrative processes. 
The network operator will then only have contact with consumers in relation to faults or connection 
issues. One of the most important customer processes in the energy market is billing. With the 
introduction of the supplier model, customers will still receive only one energy bill for both the 
supply and the transmission of energy. 
 
In addition to introducing the supplier model, the bill makes it possible for network operators to 
start offering smart energy meters. This has the advantage that once they are installed, these smart 
meters eliminate any ambiguity in terms of meter readings, whether for final accounts for 
consumers switching or moving house or for regular annual accounts. 
 
Finally, the amendment also introduces the so-called model contract. The model contract will be 




Notwithstanding the above measures intended to increase consumer confidence in the retail 
market, many people have a flawed perception of the benefits and costs of participating actively in 
it. The NMa is tasked with encouraging the elimination of the obstacles preventing consumers 
from playing a more active role in the market. Consumers’ flawed perception regarding the costs 
and risks of switching suppliers is part of this remit. 
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When liberalisation in the retail market was introduced, switching suppliers presented all kinds of 
problems. These teething problems had a detrimental effect on the development of the market. The 
NMa has been working with the sector to solve most of the problems: consumers can now switch 
supplier without giving rise to all manner of administrative problems. However, the consumer 
survey reveals that many consumers do not yet perceive it to be so. A large group of consumers has 
the mistaken impression that switching to a different product or supplier is difficult and that it 
could even put the security of their energy supply at risk.  
 
Although market parties themselves have an interest in informing consumers about this, 
consumers are likely to rate this information differently than they would were the government to 
actively inform them about the actual costs and risks involved in switching. One of the NMa’s 
actions will be to inform consumers generically about the benefits to be had from switching to 
other products or suppliers. This could be done through the Consuwijzer website, for example. In 
order to increase consumer confidence in the energy market, the NMa is focusing more on 
communicating effectively about its supervision of the energy market and suppliers. 
 
Suppliers are already informing consumers very actively about the benefits of switching (in a 
specific direction). But many consumers find it difficult to obtain a clear overall view. Price 
comparison websites can help them do so. The NMa offers comparative information on energy 
suppliers via the Energiewijzer at www.consuwijzer.nl. It also investigates the quality of price 
comparison websites in order to increase consumer confidence in finding good, comparable price 
information. 
 
In their general terms and conditions, suppliers state that any tariff increases will be announced no 
later than on the day the increase takes effect, for example via their website. In addition, tariff 
increases must be communicated directly to the customer within one month of the change. In this 
way consumers are kept informed of the actual price they are paying, which can be an incentive to 
actively look for better prices or services. But if suppliers were to inform their customers of price 
changes in advance, as is compulsory in the telecoms sector, this effect could be amplified.   
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3 
 
The Dutch wholesale gas market is connected to the European market. As a producing country, the 
Netherlands exports gas to neighbouring countries such as Germany, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom. Gas is also imported from Russia and Norway, and in the near future it will also arrive in 
liquid form (LNG) from the Middle-East, for example. On the Dutch market gas is sold by 
producers and trading companies to industrial users, suppliers to the retail markets and, of course, 
other trading companies. Industrial users generally purchase a constant flow of gas, while suppliers 
to households have to deal with peaks and troughs in gas consumption that are closely linked to 
weather conditions. Less gas is purchased in the summer than in the winter. In addition, gas is not 
used consistently throughout the day: there is less demand at night than in the daytime. There are 
also differences in the gas supply between producers: gas comes into the Netherlands in a 
reasonably constant flow from the small fields and through imports, while gas production from the 
Groningen field varies strongly over time.  
 
 
The NMa aims to create a wholesale gas market with sufficient competition between producers and 
traders, so that the gas price is formed in an efficient way. A gas market such as this has the 
following characteristics: 
 
-  Market parties have access to transmission capacity and gas storage facilities on equal 
terms and in a market-consistent way 
-  Market parties can combine gas from different sources to meet demand that fluctuates 
over time.  
-  Market parties have equal access to sufficient information to enable them to trade and 
compete.  
-  There is a liquid marketplace where market parties can buy and sell gas at low transaction 
costs. 
 
A properly functioning wholesale gas market is also extremely important for the retail market. By 
buying smartly, suppliers can differentiate themselves from their competitors in this market. On 
the other hand, if there is too little choice in the wholesale market and all suppliers are more or less 
compelled to conclude contracts on the same terms, competitiveness in the retail market does not 
really get off the ground. This also leads to higher gas prices for consumers. A properly functioning 
gas market will also benefit the wholesale electricity market. A considerable proportion of the 
electricity produced in the Netherlands is generated by gas-fired power plants which are often also 




Office of Energy Regulation  - 17 / 38 -  December 2009 
 
A number of positive developments occurred in the gas market in 2008. Some obstacles in the 
infrastructure (especially in relation to quality conversion, but also cross-border) diminished, while 
the liquidity of the TTF marketplace
4 increased. 
 
In 2007 there were regular capacity shortages in gas imports from Germany (physical congestion). 
At the beginning of 2008 the technical import capacity at the border with Germany was increased. 
Partly for this reason, the degree of utilisation (the extent to which the booked capacity is utilised) 
was substantially lower in 2008 than in previous years (see figure 3.1). So there was still sufficient 
capacity in a physical sense. The reason why the capacity is not utilised better is partly because it is 
allocated inefficiently. As a result, parties that would like to use capacity do not have access to it 




In addition, significant progress has been made in terms of quality conversion
5. In the past, quality 
conversion was seen by shippers (suppliers and traders) as a obstacle in the gas market. Shippers 
had to pre-book conversion capacity, but the available capacity was limited and was fully booked a 
long time in advance. The NMa has long been striving to abolish advance booking of quality 
conversion, and recently this obstacle was resolved. Partly at the urging of the NMa, the network 
operator GTS and Gasterra have made arrangements on gas swaps under which, at GTS's request, 
                                                            
4 TTF stands for Title Transfer Facility. It is an administrative trading place where market parties can transfer 
gas (‘gas titles’) to one another (trading). 
5 Quality conversion is the conversion of high calorific gas to low calorific gas. Groningen gas is originally low 
calorific, so consumption in the Netherlands is largely geared to this calorific value. But gas from Russia or 
Norway is high calorific. This gas can only be used by small Dutch customers if it is converted.  
Figure 3.1
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Gasterra supplies GTS with more L gas and less H gas, which means in practice that high-calorific 
gas is being swapped for low-calorific gas. This administrative form of quality conversion 
supplements the physical capacity of the conversion stations. As a result, the maximum capacity of 
conversion stations now no longer imposes a limit on the quantities of gas GTS can convert, so 
there is more evidence of the existence of a single gas market. This has increased the liquidity of 
the marketplaces, which is having a positive impact on the market parties’ trading options. 
 
The supplied and traded volume on the TTF marketplace more than doubled in 2008 (see figure 
3.2). Whereas growth in volumes had to some extent stagnated in previous years, trade on the TTF 
recovered significantly in 2008. The increasing significance of the TTF in the gas market is 
evidenced by the share of the total gas flows in the Netherlands made up by the gas supplied via 
TTF, which rose from 8% in 2007 to 18% in 2008. Interestingly, from April 2009 there was a 
significant drop in the traded volume on the TTF. This is partly explained by the fact that demand 
for gas fell because of the economic downturn.  
The churn rate on the TTF, a measure that expresses how often supplied gas has been traded, was 
3.2 in 2008. This is slightly lower than in 2007, when the churn was 3.7. This (albeit small) drop in 
the churn rate could be connected with the strong growth in the volume supplied. Another 
explanation could be that restrictive conditions are being written into contracts, so not all the gas 




The improved liquidity of the TTF is also expressed in the lower bid/offer spread. The smaller the 
spread between the bid price and the offer price, the more efficient and more secure the market is 
and the lower the transaction costs will be. The bid/offer spread for daily, monthly and annual 
Figure 3.2
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contracts on the TTF in 2008 was lower than in the previous year (see table 2.1). The positive 
development is most striking in the case of day-ahead contracts from 2006 onwards.  
 
 
A comparison with the marketplaces in neighbouring countries reveals that the efficiency of foreign 
marketplaces has improved in a similar way. The bid/offer spread fell in foreign marketplaces as 
well (see figure 3.3). The graph also shows that the bid/offer spread on the TTF is at an average 




The difference between the gas price on the TTF and the prices in the marketplaces in neighbouring 
countries fell again in 2008 (see figure 3.4). Price differences still occur, but they are shrinking 
constantly. Furthermore, prices on the marketplace in one country are not structurally above or 
below those in another. This shows that the prices in the different marketplaces are more closely 
related to one another – a direct result of the reduction in congestion on the borders. Despite this 
increasing correlation between the prices in the various marketplaces, it cannot yet be said that the 
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0.5 % 0.9 % 2.3 % Dayahead
2008 2007 2006 Type of contract
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0.5 % 0.9 % 2.3 % Dayahead
2008 2007 2006 Type of contract
Figure 3.3
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Despite the improvements in the operation of the gas market, a number of obstacles still remain in 
relation to market structure, access to the infrastructure and the types of products that can be 
traded on the TTF.  
 
The gas market is still characterised by extremely high concentration. When demand for gas is high, 
on winter days, buyers on the gas market have a limited choice of suppliers. One player is pivotal 
60% of the time. The more pivotal a player is, the more scope it has to influence the market price. 
Indeed, statistical analysis reveals that between 2006 and 2008 there was a correlation between the 
degree of pivotality and price levels on the TTF.  
 
There is contractual congestion on the import connection from Germany: the capacity of the 
import connection from Germany is fully booked for the next few years, while market parties are 
demanding more capacity. The capacity is hardly ever utilised to the full (see Table 3.2) – even at 
times when the price difference between the German and Dutch marketplaces would make it 
logical to utilise it fully.  
 
The cause of this inefficiency is the present allocation mechanism (the way in which capacity is 
allocated to market parties). For many years it has been booked on a first come, first served basis. 
Market parties which have been allocated capacity through this system but do not use it are only 
transferring the capacity via the secondary market to a very limited extent. They are not willing to 
give up the capacity just to enable them to import flexibility in the short term. But even parties that 
Figure 3.4
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Market parties view the limited availability of transmission capacity as restrictive. According to the 
annual survey of market parties, they see the shortage of available transmission capacity as a 
significant obstacle to becoming more active in the market.  
 
The survey also reveals that market parties also regard the shortage of storage capacity as a major 
obstacle. The gas storage facilities were used more in 2008 than in previous years (see figure 3.5), 
although market parties still only have limited access to the total technical storage capacity. This 
limited accessibility is one of the causes of the concentration in the gas market. Calculations show 
that the limited access has pushed the price on the wholesale market a few percent higher than it 






This table shows the 
utilisation rate and 
percentage of full utilisation
of H-gas import capacity
Source: GTS
0% 0% 30% Full utilisation
20% 41% 62% Utilisation rate Belgium
0% 2% 0% Full utilisation
70% 84% 78% Utilisation rate Germany
2008 2007 2006 H-gasImport capacity
0% 0% 30% Full utilisation
20% 41% 62% Utilisation rate Belgium
0% 2% 0% Full utilisation
70% 84% 78% Utilisation rate Germany
2008 2007 2006 H-gasImport capacity
Figure 3.5
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In addition to capacity shortages, limited transparency also appears to act as a barrier to market 
parties (see figure 3.6). According to the survey of shippers, the limited information on available 
storage capacity and on the price of flexibility is regarded as a obstacle by market parties. The 
quality and timeliness of steering information
6 is generally rated as poor. In view of the forthcoming 
introduction of a new balancing regime, this can be described as worrying, although there are 
various measures in place to solve this problem (see section 3.4). The switch to a market-based 
balancing regime is applauded by shippers, as is the intention to only charge for imbalance if the 
whole system is in imbalance. Replacing the current balancing regime, which operates with 
imbalance levies, with a market-based system will make the price for imbalance more efficient – in 
other words, in direct relation to the value of imbalance positions in the market. This will also 
enable shippers to make more effective decisions. 
 
Complete and reliable steering information is essential if this new balancing regime is to function 
properly. Several shippers therefore cite the quality and timeliness of steering information as the 
most important area for improvement in the gas market. 
 
  
                                                            
6 Market parties need steering information to ensure that the quantity of gas they have bought for a particular 
hour is in balance with the quantity of gas their customers buy in that hour. A lack of steering information 
prevents market parties from being able to react promptly to changed market conditions, thus increasing the 
risk of imbalance (and the resulting imbalance levies). 
Figure 3.6
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average opinions of 
shippers on the degree 
of transparency in the 
market.
The opinions are based 
on the annual survey of 
shippers.
Source: Shippers survey
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The fact that more gas is being offered on the TTF is a positive development in itself. The increase 
in the supply of low-calorific gas (L-gas) can be considered positive, although the total size is still 
limited compared to the total gas market (see figure 3.7). As a result the TTF can increasingly 
become a source for suppliers to small consumers (who, after all, use L-gas). However, the 
difference between H-gas and L-gas is becoming less and less important now that there is less of a 
restriction on converting H-gas to L-gas via quality conversion.  
 
There is still scope for improvement in the product offer on the TTF. To be able to supply 
consumers, both long-term and short-term products are needed so that end-users can create the 
load profile they need. Although liquidity in the day-ahead market improved in 2008, the proportion 
of short-term products (day-ahead and within-day) is still low (see figure 3.8). Many suppliers are 
therefore still finding it difficult to supply consumers by purchasing on the TTF.  
 
What is more, most of the gas is still supplied directly from the source behind the exit point
7. But 
the fact that it is supplied directly at the exit point means that this gas cannot be traded on the TTF 
and also cannot be combined with gas from underground storage, for example. Although 
customers are theoretically able to buy gas on the TTF (see section 3.4), in practice this will depend 
on the supply of short-term products. Because these are currently in short supply, shippers – in 
particular suppliers to the retail market – are being hindered in their attempts to develop their own 
purchasing strategies on the gas wholesale market.  
 
                                                            
7 An exit point is the physical system connection at which the gas flows out of the GTS transmission network.  
Figure 3.7
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The obstacles described above are not new. Over the past few years, therefore, various measures 




Partly in response to the NMa’s 2007 advice to the Minister of Economic Affairs concerning the 
TTF, the Minister announced various changes to the law in a letter to Parliament on 18 February 
2008
8. These changes are known by the term ‘gas market measures’. The measures announced by 
the Minister include:  
a.  a market-based balancing regime which will enable every market party to contribute to 
maintaining balance in the gas transmission network 
b.  promoting the tradability of gas so that a buyer of gas can decide what he is going to do 
with his gas himself: use it or lose it  
c.  (by ministerial regulation) measures to promote the availability of short-term import and 
export capacity in particular. 
 
 
In consultation with the sector and the NMa, the TSO GTS has developed a new balancing 
regime. This new regime is designed to ensure that market parties can contribute to 
maintaining the balance in the gas transmission network themselves. To achieve this, a 
new balancing regime has been developed which is comparable to the system in use in the 
                                                            
8 Parliamentary documents II 2008/09 31 904, no. 2 ff. 
Figure 3.8
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electricity market. The new balancing regime is expected to come into effect on 1 April 2011. 
A point for consideration at the present time is the steering information  This is the 
measurement information market parties need to enable them to decide whether to buy or 
sell additional gas within the day to prevent an imbalance. Fast and reliable steering 
information and sufficient access to flexibility are two essential requirements for the 
success of the new balancing regime. Provision of up-to-date information on its own 
position and the balance situation in the system will be a statutory task of the TSO. In 
addition, large customers are obliged to install remote reading meters. 
 
 
At the present time, the party feeding the gas into the network often also decides where the 
gas will leave it. Once the gas passes the exit point it can no longer be traded. Therefore, 
the buyer of the gas is unable to choose whether to use the gas himself or to sell it to a 
third party. He would need the cooperation of his supplier to do so. The legislative bill 
stipulates that the party that feeds gas into or withdraws gas from the gas transmission 
network is in principle itself responsible for the entry and exit programme on its 
connection. The entry and exit programmes (control over the transmission of the gas) are 
being split by law. The purchaser of gas therefore no longer needs to obtain consent from 
his supplier to decide what he wants to do with his gas, which fixes a major obstacle in 
terms of the tradability of gas. However, customers will still need to be able to obtain all the 
products they need, including short-term products, on the TTF. At the moment there are 
too few short-term products being offered on the TTF. The NMa expects that once 




At the present time, cross-border transmission capacity can often be booked for longer 
periods only. This makes it difficult for newcomers to supply gas at short notice or 
temporarily on the Dutch market. The Minister has therefore announced measures to 
improve the availability of cross-border transmission capacity. These measures, which 
include the compulsory redistribution of unused capacity, will be regulated by a ministerial 
regulation. In 2008 some market parties took the initiative themselves to make unused 
capacity available. In February the Dutch and German high-voltage network operators GTS 
and BEB launched the EUCABO platform. This platform enables market parties to book 
combined day-ahead interruptible capacity on the cross-border connection between the 
Netherlands and Germany (at Bunde-Oude Statenzijl). In addition, in May 2008 the APX 




New European legislation entered into force in September 2009: the ‘third package' of energy 
legislation. The regulations, which become binding on 3 March 2011, give a significant boost to the 
integration of the European gas market. For example, they tighten up the requirements for the  
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information that market parties and network operators must provide. In addition, a European 
regulator is being appointed to supervise cross-border matters, and TSOs are being compelled to 
cooperate with each other more. More international cooperation is a clear message of the ‘third 
package'.  
 
Secondary trading of transmission capacity, particularly import capacity and storage capacity, can 
increase short-term flexibility on the Dutch market. Parties currently have various options for 
trading capacity rights: bilaterally, via the GTS Bulletin Board, or via APX. Nonetheless, many 
market parties find these options inadequate. The promoting of secondary capacity trading is 
currently being studied in the European context. ERGEG, the European Regulators' Group for 
Electricity and Gas, has launched a project focusing on measures to make transmission capacity 
more easily available.  
 
 
Although the ongoing measures and those already implemented are designed to bring about 
further improvements in the wholesale gas market, additional measures are needed. The key to 
greater competition in the Dutch gas market lies in the availability of flexibility. The Groningen field 
is still the most important source of flexibility, but only one party can make use of this source. In 
previous studies by the NMa it was established that Gasterra has a dominant position in the short-
term flexibility market. Market parties, especially those supplying consumers, have very little choice 
in sources of seasonal flexibility. These market parties can therefore find it difficult to develop their 
own purchasing strategy. 
 
The limited availability of seasonal flexibility in the market hinders competition in the gas market. 
The demand for seasonal flexibility is expected to rise rather than fall in the near future, partly in 
view of the Netherlands’ ambition to become a European ‘gas roundabout’. The Netherlands has 
significant sources of seasonal flexibility available. However, these storage facilities are only 
available to market parties other than the present contract holder, Gasterra, to a very limited extent. 
This limits the choices available to market parties wanting to purchase seasonal flexibility.  
In recent years the NMa has always taken a positive stance towards developments and initiatives 
that increase access to flexibility, particularly when the flexibility becomes available to parties other 
than the established order and is tradable and re-tradable on the TTF. The aim of this is to increase 
competition in the gas market. 
The new gas storage facility in Bergermeer, which is being developed by TAQA, will be a major 
source of seasonal flexibility and will be made available to the entire market by the storage operator 
through third party access. But this storage will not be sufficient to supply the entire demand for 
flexibility. In addition, it is only expected to become operational in 2014. 
 
The limited free availability translates into a gas price that is higher than it need be. The NMa 
considers that the choice of the present structure rather than one with greater third party access is  
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detrimental to the consumer. In the interests of the development of the gas roundabout based 
around a liquid TF marketplace, the NMa intends to bring this to the attention of the EZ. In 
addition, the NMa and other stakeholders will be re-examining whether more capacity could and 
should be made available via TPA, taking their statutory tasks and existing contracts into account. 
 
A measure for improving the market for short-term flexibility is to strengthen the operation of the 
TTF. Up to now it has been virtually impossible to buy short-term products on the TTF. The gas 
market measures proposed by the Minister are expected to bring about an increase in the volume 
of gas flowing via the TTF. Nonetheless, it is at least as important to ensure that there is a wide 
diversity of tradable products available so that market parties can come to the TTF for their 
flexibility as well. The proposed legislative change puts in place some important conditions for the 
development of short-term trading on the TTF. However, the NMa believes that more needs to be 
done to get the market off the ground quickly. Even if there is only one supplier of these products 
to begin with, the terms under which the market parties can purchase them will never be less 
favourable in an open marketplace than in the current situation of bilateral trading. The NMa 
furthermore recommends making the Combiflex system suitable for the new balancing method as 
soon as possible so that shippers can use it to manage their balance positions in the market-based 
balancing system. 
 
The lack of reliable steering information is seen by market parties as a major obstacle to balancing 
their portfolios. To obtain reliable steering information, it is important to install hourly meters on 
industrial connections in the regional network. The technical codes now stipulate that these 
industrial users are obliged to install remote reading meters. There seem to be some practical 
problems in the implementation of this obligation. For example, responsibility for (and the cost of) 
installing the metering equipment lies with the connected parties, even though they do not derive 
any direct benefit from the metering equipment themselves. In theory, it is the shippers who 
benefit. To pave the way for a properly functioning balancing regime the market parties need to 
ensure that the meters are implemented quickly so that the new balancing regime can come into 
effect on the scheduled date.  
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A fundamental characteristic of the electricity market is that production and use need to be in 
balance with each other at all times. Unlike virtually any other product, electricity cannot be stored 
on a large scale. But like gas, electricity consumption can fluctuate significantly over time because 
the demand for electricity differs from hour to hour. In the Netherlands the outside temperature 
only plays a minor role in the demand for electricity, as houses and buildings are mainly heated by 
gas. Unlike the gas market, therefore, the Dutch electricity market has traditionally not been subject 
to seasonal fluctuations. However, seasonality is set to play an increasingly important role in the 
Netherlands now that the Dutch market is connected to those of neighbouring countries such as 
France and Norway where electricity is more widely used for cooling and heating. 
 
 
The NMa aims to create a wholesale electricity market with sufficient competition between 
producers and traders, so that the electricity price is formed in an efficient way. An electricity 
market such as this has the following characteristics: 
 
-  Market parties have access to transmission capacity on equal terms and in a market-
consistent way 
-  Market parties can buy and combine electricity from different suppliers to meet demand 
that fluctuates over time 
-  Market parties have equal access to sufficient information  




As a result of the large number of measures introduced in recent years, competition in the 
wholesale electricity market is much further advanced than in the gas market. The cross-border 
capacity (for the coming year, month and day) is allocated by auction. Tennet’s balancing system 
was the inspiration for the forthcoming balancing regime in the gas market. There is also an active 
trade in long-term and short-term products on the exchanges (APX and Endex) and other 
marketplaces (OTC). Positive developments in 2008 were the introduction of intraday capacity and 
netting on borders and an increase in liquidity on the APX.  
 
 
On the cross-border connections with Germany, market parties can obtain year-ahead, month-
ahead and day-ahead capacity by auction. In the past it was not possible to respond to changing 
market conditions on the day itself. Since December 2008, however, any capacity remaining after 
the (explicit) daily auction is now made available to the market on an intraday basis. On the border 
with Belgium, where implicit daily auctions (market coupling) are already taking place, this has  
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been possible since May 2009. At the same time, the current allocation mechanism (pro-rata) 
needs to be replaced by a more market-based system. Network operators and regulators in the 
Central Western European region are currently working with market parties to develop just such a 
system. 
In September 2008, the operators of the high-voltage networks in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Germany introduced the principle of netting on the borders. This enables the import and export 
nominations to be netted for the calculation of day-ahead capacity. This capacity is therefore 
increasing with the size of the nominations of annual and monthly capacity in the opposite 
direction. 
 
The completion in 2008 of NorNed, the connection with Norway, created a connection to a market 
in which electricity prices are considerably lower than in the Netherlands and Germany (see figure 
4.1). Because of this significant price difference, NorNed has been utilised intensively. Imports of 




The volume of day-ahead trading on the APX electricity exchange has increased by more than 4 
TWh to 25 TWh on an annual basis (see figure 4.2). This growth in the trading volume has further 
strengthened the liquidity of the APX. This is evidenced by a reduction in the price-sensitivity to 
changes in demand: 50 MW additional demand would result in a 0.5% price increase (compared 
with 0.9% in 2007), and 500 MW additional demand would result in a price increase of 6.1% 
(compared with 14.3% in 2007).  
Figure 4.1
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There are still a few major obstacles in the wholesale electricity market. The most important of 
these are the available capacity on the borders and the high concentration in supplies on the 
domestic market. In addition, market transparency in relation to generation in particular is by no 
means optimal.  
 
The introduction of intraday trading and netting on the borders with Germany and Belgium does 
not yet mean that the interconnection capacity is now being optimally utilised. Because 
transmission capacity (for day-ahead) is auctioned explicitly, utilisation of the connections with 
Germany and Norway is still beset by inefficiencies. It regularly happens that border connections 
are not fully utilised, even though there are significant price differences between Germany and the 
Netherlands (see figure 4.3). The introduction of market coupling will eliminate this inefficiency, as 
the experience on the border with Belgium shows (see figure 4.4).  
 
Market coupling means that the capacity available for the next day is auctioned together with the 
electricity for the day-ahead market (implicitly), as opposed to auctioning capacity separately 
(explicitly). This method of implicit auctioning results in optimal utilisation of the day-ahead 
capacity. Without market coupling, many opportunities for arbitrage between APX, EEX and 
NordPool remain unutilised. Market coupling with Germany, and later with Norway, is expected to 
be introduced in 2010.  
Figure 4.2
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Another factor preventing the border capacity with Norway from being optimally utilised is the 
ramping constraint applied by the Scandinavian network operators. This means that the speed at 
which the flow direction on NorNed can be reversed is limited, so it is not always possible to utilise 
the full physical capacity of this connection. The ramping constraint is designed to prevent 
instability on the Scandinavian network. 
 
Finally, the border capacity which Tennet makes available to the market is potentially limited 
because Tennet does not perform its calculations jointly with network operators in neighbouring 
Figure 4.3
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countries. A more coordinated approach should result in Tennet needing to reserve less to manage 
the network and therefore being able to offer more to the market.  
 
 
The electricity market is still a concentrated market. It regularly happens that one or more 
producers are pivotal in meeting the total demand for electricity. The pivotality of producers 
actually increased in 2008. Statistical analyses reveal that there is a significant correlation between 
the pivotality of individual players and the scarcity at sector level on the one hand and the profit (on 
the margin) that electricity companies achieve on the other. The more individual players are pivotal 
and the greater the shortage in the market, the higher the profit for the marginal (price-setting) 
power plant. As a result, the profitability of electricity generation is still high: the profit per MW 
turns out to be considerably higher than the fixed costs of investing in a power plant. 
 
The lack of transparency is another obstacle. A survey of traders reveals that they feel they have too 
little information on the total available generation capacity and the expected demand for electricity. 
Market parties can use this information to better inform their price expectations. 
 
By far the bulk of electricity is traded on the OTC (over-the-counter) market. By comparison with 
other countries, the OTC market in the Netherlands has a high bid/offer spread (see figure 4.5). 
The bid/offer spread is a measure of the market’s efficiency. The smaller the spread between the 
bid price and the offer price, the more efficient and more secure the market is and the lower the 
transaction costs will be. In recent years the spread in the German and French markets has 
remained constant, but it has been considerably higher in the Dutch market. The difference in 
liquidity could be connected with the differences in the size of the respective national markets. 
However, there has been a drop in the bid/offer spread since 2006, which indicates an 
improvement in liquidity.  
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The obstacles described above are not new, but the analysis shows that they are still relevant. 
Energy consumers could benefit if these obstacles were to be eliminated. In recent years various 
measures have been put in place to improve the operation of the electricity market and its 
integration with neighbouring countries. The most important of these are described below. 
 
After the success of the market coupling with Belgium and France, work is also ongoing on market 
coupling with Germany and Norway. The coupling will further integrate the day-ahead markets with 
one another, which will benefit competition in the Netherlands as it will reduce the pivotality of 
Dutch producers. Market coupling with the German market is now at an advanced stage. If all goes 
to plan, the markets will be coupled in the second quarter of 2010. The gate closure time (the time 
when trading in day-ahead products closes) will then be 12:00 throughout the whole region. 
Coupling with the Norwegian market will follow in the second half of 2010.  
 
Market parties have an increasing need for a properly functioning intraday market. In order to 
create the necessary liquidity on this market, the existing national intraday market will be coupled 
with the intraday markets in neighbouring countries. A consultation of market parties has revealed 
that they would prefer to see a system of continuous trading with implicit allocation of border 
capacity. The regulators in the Central Western European region (CWE region) will publish their 
joint position on this in the fourth quarter of 2009.  
 
Figure 4.5
The graph shows the 
bid/offer spread of monthly 
contracts on the OTC market 
in the Netherlands, Germany 
and France in 2005 to 2008.
Source: Platts
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Two effective measures for improving the utilisation of the available border capacity are the 
introduction of a system of regional intraday trading and market coupling with Norway.  
 
The switch to a system of flow-based market coupling in the CWE region during the course of 2011 
will also help enable more efficient utilisation of the available border capacity. The global network 
model required by the European regulation will also play a role in the calculation of the available 
transmission capacity. It is expected that this global network model will determine the transmission 
capacity that is available for the market in a more efficient way. Furthermore, it will enable the 
available transmission capacity to be distributed optimally across the borders between the CWE 
countries on the basis of market demand.  
 
In addition to making better use of the available capacity, it is at least as important to create more 
physical capacity. In line with the ‘third package’, network operators in Central Western Europe will 
be developing a regional transmission plan and a system adequacy forecast. This is ultimately 
intended to result in a regional investment plan which will spell out clearly which investments in 
European network will contribute most to welfare in the region.  
This not only entails looking at investments in cross-border connections between countries but 
also investments in a country’s own connections, in order to create the best possible integrated 
market. 
 
There are various plans to invest in new power plants in the Netherlands. New (additional) power 
plants must come on stream if the market structure is to improve. The larger the generation 
capacity (of existing or new producers), the less producers will play a pivotal role in meeting the 
demand for electricity, which will exert downward pressure on the electricity price. However, the 
proposed investments in power plants are in a number of cases hindered by a lack of transmission 
capacity on the high-voltage network: Tennet is unable to connect the power plants in time.  
In January 2009 the NMa published a vision document on the transmission capacity shortages. In 
response to this document, in November 2009 Tennet put forward proposals to make more 
efficient use of the existing network capacity. The amendments to the Network Code proposed by 
Tennet are expected to come into force in 2010. In addition, in combination with the proposed 
amendment of the Priority for Sustainable Energy Act the EZ is creating a congestion management 
system which will enable even more production capacity to be connected to the network and 
safeguard security of supply in the event of an impending overload.  
 
The changes to the connection policy and the introduction of congestion management are intended 
to make the existing network more efficient. In the long term, however, this will not be enough to 
enable all the new production capacity to be connected and transmitted without restriction. For this 
reason, Tennet is working on expanding and upgrading the high-voltage network in various regions 
(Randstad, North Netherlands and South Netherlands).  
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Following the above, the NMa will also amend the connection procedure in the technical codes. 
The new procedure should introduce more clarity and certainty regarding the obligations of the 
network operator and investors towards one another in the process of connecting a new power 
plant. This kind of system of mutual obligations will help improve the investment climate. The 
necessary code changes are expected to come into effect during the course of 2010. 
 
 
The lack of transparency is currently being addressed at European level. In the CWE region, 
transparency of available network capacity and production capacity is high on the agenda. The joint 
regulators in the CWE region have adopted a document on transparency. This document is now 
being used in most of Europe as a guideline for achieving the necessary level of transparency. 
Tennet is working on implementing the new rules, and in 2008 launched the website 
energieinfo.tennet.org to bring together the required information in one location.  
 
 
As can be seen from the above, various measures are already in place to solve the residual 
obstacles in the electricity market. Once all of these measures have been implemented, the 
structural characteristics of this market should be close to the target scenario. But there is still 
much work to be done before we get there. Some measures have been in preparation for a 
considerable time now, their implementation having been postponed on several occasions. This is 
not a satisfactory situation. The challenge for the coming period is to ensure that the measures that 
are in preparation are actually translated into effective actions.  
 
The emphasis in all of this must be on international cooperation. Most of the measures are being 
taken jointly with other countries in the CWE region. The next step is to integrate the various 
regions that are still separate in Europe. The first preparations are being made in this regard. 
Tennet also needs to further expand the available transmission capacity in cooperation with the 
foreign network operators. The cable between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (BritNed) 
will go live in 2010. The aim is to couple with the day-ahead market in the UK via BritNed.  
At home, we need to make sure investments in new production capacity are not being hindered by 
scarcity on the domestic network. It is therefore extremely important to ensure fast implementation 
of a cost-effective congestion management system as part of the Priority for Sustainable Energy bill.  
 
It will still be necessary to supervise the electricity market even when the proposed market structure 
is in place. Due to a number of factors (such as inelastic demand, concentration in supply and the 
fact that electricity cannot be stored), the electricity market is inherently vulnerable to the exercising 
of market power. It is therefore important to continue to monitor the electricity market. This relates 
not only to domestic production but also to the utilisation of domestic and cross-border 
transmission infrastructure and trading on the various marketplaces. 
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The aim of this Monitor is to paint a picture of how far competition on the wholesale and retail 
markets for gas and electricity has progressed and what additional measures need to be taken to fix 
existing obstacles. We have outlined this picture of the market in the previous chapters. The 
question now is: how do these markets interact with one another? Where have the greatest 
successes been achieved, where do the biggest obstacles still lie, and where should we be focusing 
our attention now? 
 
Although competition has only recently been introduced in the retail market, this market has 
progressed the furthest. The actual situation in this market is closest to the target scenario. 
Suppliers can enter this market fairly easily, and it is easy for consumers to switch from one 
supplier to another. The transparency of the market is also much improved. The electricity and gas 
retail market is increasingly becoming a market that is similar to other retail markets, such as the 
financial products market (insurance, savings accounts etc) in which the most significant ‘hurdle’ 
is the somewhat passive attitude of consumers.  
 
In terms of the wholesale markets, the electricity market is the best developed. There are various 
liquid marketplaces in this market, and market parties can increasingly make use of the essential 
infrastructure. The available capacity on the border connections is being distributed in a market-
consistent way (auction). In addition, day-ahead capacity is auctioned implicitly (market coupling) 
and netting is also used. As a result, the capacity on border connections is increasingly being better 
utilised. 
 
Progress has also been made in the gas wholesale market on various fronts, although all in all still 
not enough to be able to describe it as a competitive market. Traded and supplied volumes on the 
TTF marketplace increased in 2008, as a result of which TTF's share of the total Dutch gas flows 
increased from 8% to 18%. There was also a slight improvement in the use of the border 
connections. Day-ahead transmission capacity is now available on an interruptible basis and via the 
secondary market, providing more opportunities for arbitrage between the marketplaces in the 
Netherlands and Germany. Progress has also been made in quality conversion: the capacity of 
conversion stations no longer stands in the way of players with H-gas entering the L-gas market. 
 
The biggest obstacles affecting competition in the electricity and gas markets are in the gas 
wholesale market. But there are still a few obstacles in the electricity market which are hindering 
the creation of a competitive market. The deficiencies in the operation of the wholesale markets 
impact on the operation of the retail markets. 
 
The gas market is still a highly concentrated market. The pivotality of the biggest player remains 
unchanged in size: this player is needed more than 60% of the time to enable the entire demand 
for gas to be met. The extent of pivotality does not change much over the years because the other  
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market players’ production, storage and transmission capacities have not changed much. Gasterra 
has the exclusive right to sell the gas from the Groningen field, and also obtains most gas from the 
other Dutch production fields under the Small Fields Policy. 
Obstacles to new entrants are perpetuating a concentrated market structure. The scarcity of 
transmission capacity and the scarcity of storage capacity are perceived as a particular barrier by 
shippers, to whom access to transmission capacity and storage capacity is vitally important. The 
current allocation mechanism for transmission capacity and the limited access to gas storage 
facilities for third parties offer little scope for trading more actively. Infrastructure is often booked 
out several years in advance on a first come, first served basis (based on peak demand), so 
congestion on the infrastructure is often of a contractual nature. This keeps unused capacity out of 
the reach of other shippers. In addition, shippers rate the quality and timeliness of steering 
information as unreservedly poor, making it difficult for them to participate actively in the market. 
The product offer on the TTF is not sufficient to cover shippers’ needs. To supply end-users, 
shippers need to be able to vary their gas supply. Products shorter than one day are only traded on 
the TTF to a very limited extent, however, so shippers cannot rely on the TTF to coordinate their 
supplies with gas take-up.  
 
The biggest obstacles in the electricity market are the ongoing high concentration in supply and the 
poor utilisation of the cross-border infrastructure. Unlike in the gas market, there are several 
producers of a similar size in this market, but despite this pivotality is a problem here too. During a 
large number of peak hours throughout the year, one or more producers are pivotal in meeting the 
total demand. During these hours competitive pressure is minimal, which is also expressed in the 
level of prices. The pivotality of producers active in the Netherlands is partly caused by poor 
utilisation of the cross-border connections. The lack of market coupling with Germany and Norway 
means that the connections are not utilised optimally. Furthermore, the capacity on the 
interconnectors provided by the network operators is possibly too low in view of the technical 
capacities of the lines. Competition in the electricity markets is further hampered by a lack of 
transparency on the total available generation capacity and the expected demand for electricity. 
 
The main factor hindering competition on the retail market is consumer resistance to participating 
more actively in the market. Many consumers perceive the costs and risks involved in playing an 
active role in the energy market as outweighing the potential benefits. The number of passive 
consumers is still fairly high, so there is a considerable difference between the price active 
consumers are paying and that paid by non-active consumers. The relatively high consumer 
passivity furthermore limits competition between suppliers.  
 
In particular, action needs to be taken to improve the operation of the gas market. Not only 
because this is where the biggest obstacles lie, but also because the operation of the gas market 
has a direct impact on the operation of both the wholesale electricity market and the retail market. 
To improve the gas market, market parties must be allowed better access to seasonal flexibility, 
more products – especially within-day products – need to be traded on the TTF, and market parties 
need to make headway on the implementation of meters for improving steering information. In  
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addition to these actions, it is of course important to ensure that the proposed measures are 
implemented, particularly those relating to improving the balancing regime, improving the 
tradability of gas and making unused transmission capacity available. 
 
In the electricity market, more work needs to be done on expanding the available capacity for cross-
border connections. It is important that market coupling with Germany and Norway is achieved in 
2010. Tennet, in collaboration with foreign TSOs, also needs to continue to work on expanding the 
available transmission capacity. In addition, it is important to make sure investments in new 
production capacity are not hindered by shortages on the domestic network. It is therefore vital that 
the proposed congestion management system be implemented as soon as possible. 
 
Finally, in the retail market the most important measure is to inform consumers (generically) about 
the actual cost of participating actively in the market and the low risks involved in switching to a 
different supplier. If suppliers also inform consumers in advance about proposed tariff rises in 
current contracts, consumers will have even more incentive to keep an active eye on their contracts. 
 
All these measures will ultimately enable consumers to benefit from lower energy prices. 
Consumers can also make substantial savings on their energy bills themselves by playing a more 
active role in the retail market: the savings can run to as much as several hundred euros per 
household per annum.   